COURSE INFORMATION Course Title: GAME THEORY

Code	Course Type	Regular Semester	Theory	Practice	Lab	Credits	ECTS
ECO 807	C	1	3	0	0	3	10

Academic staff member responsible for the design of the course syllabus (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature)	NA
Lecturer (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature) and Office Hours:	Agim Kukeli
Second Lecturer(s) (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature) and Office Hours:	NA
Teaching Assistant(s) and Office Hours:	NA
Language:	English
Compulsory/Elective:	Elective
Classroom and Meeting Time:
Course Description:	This course is the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit.
Course Objectives:	The aim of the course is to: • provide students with sufficient knowledge of game theory to understand strategic interactions among people or organizations in order to maximize their own payoffs. • understand the importance of competitive and cooperative factors in a variety of decision problems. • learn how to structure and analyze these problems from a quantitative perspective.

COURSE OUTLINE

Week	Topics
1	An introduction to games and their theory
2	Games of chance
3	Nash equilibrium for two-person games
4	Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibrium
5	Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibrium (continues)
6	n-person games in normal form
7	Non-cooperative market games in normal form
8	Credibility and subgame perfect equilibrium
9	Repeated games
10	Repeated games (continues)
11	Signaling games and sequential equilibrium
12	Signaling games and sequential equilibrium (continues)
13	Games between a principal and an agent
14	Games between a principal and an agent (continues)

Prerequisite(s):
Textbook:	- Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole (1991), Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Other References:	- Osborne, Martin, and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press - John H. Kagel (Editor), Alvin E. Roth (1995), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press - Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press - Thomas C. Schelling (1981), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press - Colin F. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey - Vijay Krishna (2002), Auction Theory Academic Press
Laboratory Work:
Computer Usage:
Others:	No

COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES

1	Knowledge and understanding of game theory at a level required to read current research in economics in applied theory.
2	The ability to use, modify and extend existing game theory models in the students’ own research.
3	The ability to develop game theory models for the student’s own research in applied theory.
4	The ability to read current research in game theory with the help of reference texts.

COURSE CONTRIBUTION TO... PROGRAM COMPETENCIES (Blank : no contribution, 1: least contribution ... 5: highest contribution)

No	Program Competencies	Cont.
Doctorate (PhD) in Economics: Banking and Finance profile Program

COURSE EVALUATION METHOD

Method	Quantity	Percentage
Presentation	1	50
Term Paper	1	50
	Total Percent:	100%

ECTS (ALLOCATED BASED ON STUDENT WORKLOAD)

Activities	Quantity	Duration(Hours)	Total Workload(Hours)
Course Duration (Including the exam week: 16x Total course hours)	16	3	48
Hours for off-the-classroom study (Pre-study, practice)	16	4	64
Mid-terms	1	13	13
Assignments			0
Final examination	1	35	35
Other	6	15	90
Total Work Load:			250
Total Work Load/25(h):			10
ECTS Credit of the Course:			10