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Academic staff member responsible for the design of the course syllabus
(name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature)
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NA
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Lecturer (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address
and signature) and Office Hours:
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Agim Kukeli
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Second Lecturer(s) (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email
address and signature) and Office Hours:
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NA
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| Teaching Assistant(s) and Office Hours: |
NA
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| Language: |
English
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| Compulsory/Elective: |
Elective
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| Classroom and Meeting Time: |
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| Course Description: |
This course is the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit.
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| Course Objectives: |
The aim of the course is to:
• provide students with sufficient knowledge of game theory to understand strategic interactions among people or organizations in order to maximize their own payoffs.
• understand the importance of competitive and cooperative factors in a variety of decision problems.
• learn how to structure and analyze these problems from a quantitative perspective.
|
| Week |
Topics |
| 1 |
An introduction to games and their theory |
| 2 |
Games of chance |
| 3 |
Nash equilibrium for two-person games |
| 4 |
Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibrium |
| 5 |
Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibrium (continues) |
| 6 |
n-person games in normal form |
| 7 |
Non-cooperative market games in normal form |
| 8 |
Credibility and subgame perfect equilibrium |
| 9 |
Repeated games |
| 10 |
Repeated games (continues) |
| 11 |
Signaling games and sequential equilibrium |
| 12 |
Signaling games and sequential equilibrium (continues) |
| 13 |
Games between a principal and an agent |
| 14 |
Games between a principal and an agent (continues) |
| Prerequisite(s): |
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Textbook:
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- Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole (1991), Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
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Other References:
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- Osborne, Martin, and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- John H. Kagel (Editor), Alvin E. Roth (1995), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press
- Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press
- Thomas C. Schelling (1981), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press
- Colin F. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
- Vijay Krishna (2002), Auction Theory Academic Press
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| Laboratory Work: |
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| Computer Usage: |
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| Others: |
No
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| No |
Program Competencies |
Cont. |
| Doctorate (PhD) in Economics: Economics profile Program |
| 1 |
The students are gained the ability to look at the problems of daily life from a broader perspective. They gain the needed skills not only to understand economic problems but also to construct a model and defend in meaningful way. |
4 |
| 2 |
To comprehend the interaction between economics and related fields; to achieve original results by using expert knowledge in analysis, synthesis and evaluation of new and complex ideas. |
4 |
| 3 |
To be able to obtain new knowledge in economics systematically and to acquire high level skills in research methods in economics. |
3 |
| 4 |
To be able to develop new methods that make a contribution to science or to be able to apply existing techniques to an original research idea. |
3 |
| 5 |
They have ability to use mathematical and statistical methods in international economics. |
3 |
| 6 |
They know how to use computer programs in both daily office usage and statistical data evaluations in economics department. |
3 |
| 7 |
They have necessary economics skills that needed in private and public sector. |
3 |
| 8 |
They are intended to be specialist in one of departmental fields that they choose from the list of general economics, finance economics, public finance, corporate finance, finance management, international finance markets and institutions, banking and central banking, international finance and banking, money and banking, international trade and banking. |
3 |
| 9 |
They have ability to utilize fundamental economic theories and tools to solve economic problems in international level. |
3 |
| 10 |
They are aware of the fact that international economics is a social science and they respect the social perspectives and social values of the society’s ethics. |
3 |
