Course Title: GAME THEORY
Code Course Type Regular Semester Theory Practice Lab Credits ECTS
ECO 807 C 1 3 0 0 3 10
Academic staff member responsible for the design of the course syllabus (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature) NA
Lecturer (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature) and Office Hours: Agim Kukeli
Second Lecturer(s) (name, surname, academic title/scientific degree, email address and signature) and Office Hours: NA
Teaching Assistant(s) and Office Hours: NA
Language: English
Compulsory/Elective: Elective
Classroom and Meeting Time:
Course Description: This course is the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit.
Course Objectives: The aim of the course is to: • provide students with sufficient knowledge of game theory to understand strategic interactions among people or organizations in order to maximize their own payoffs. • understand the importance of competitive and cooperative factors in a variety of decision problems. • learn how to structure and analyze these problems from a quantitative perspective.
Week Topics
1 An introduction to games and their theory
2 Games of chance
3 Nash equilibrium for two-person games
4 Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibrium
5 Mixed strategies and mixed strategy equilibrium (continues)
6 n-person games in normal form
7 Non-cooperative market games in normal form
8 Credibility and subgame perfect equilibrium
9 Repeated games
10 Repeated games (continues)
11 Signaling games and sequential equilibrium
12 Signaling games and sequential equilibrium (continues)
13 Games between a principal and an agent
14 Games between a principal and an agent (continues)
Textbook: - Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole (1991), Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Other References: - Osborne, Martin, and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press - John H. Kagel (Editor), Alvin E. Roth (1995), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press - Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press - Thomas C. Schelling (1981), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press - Colin F. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey - Vijay Krishna (2002), Auction Theory Academic Press
Laboratory Work:
Computer Usage:
Others: No
1 Knowledge and understanding of game theory at a level required to read current research in economics in applied theory.
2 The ability to use, modify and extend existing game theory models in the students’ own research.
3 The ability to develop game theory models for the student’s own research in applied theory.
4 The ability to read current research in game theory with the help of reference texts.
(Blank : no contribution, 1: least contribution ... 5: highest contribution)
No Program Competencies Cont.
Doctorate (PhD) in Economics: Economics profile Program
1 The students are gained the ability to look at the problems of daily life from a broader perspective. They gain the needed skills not only to understand economic problems but also to construct a model and defend in meaningful way. 4
2 To comprehend the interaction between economics and related fields; to achieve original results by using expert knowledge in analysis, synthesis and evaluation of new and complex ideas. 4
3 To be able to obtain new knowledge in economics systematically and to acquire high level skills in research methods in economics. 3
4 To be able to develop new methods that make a contribution to science or to be able to apply existing techniques to an original research idea. 3
5 They have ability to use mathematical and statistical methods in international economics. 3
6 They know how to use computer programs in both daily office usage and statistical data evaluations in economics department. 3
7 They have necessary economics skills that needed in private and public sector. 3
8 They are intended to be specialist in one of departmental fields that they choose from the list of general economics, finance economics, public finance, corporate finance, finance management, international finance markets and institutions, banking and central banking, international finance and banking, money and banking, international trade and banking. 3
9 They have ability to utilize fundamental economic theories and tools to solve economic problems in international level. 3
10 They are aware of the fact that international economics is a social science and they respect the social perspectives and social values of the society’s ethics. 3
Method Quantity Percentage
Term Paper
Total Percent: 100%
Activities Quantity Duration(Hours) Total Workload(Hours)
Course Duration (Including the exam week: 16x Total course hours) 16 3 48
Hours for off-the-classroom study (Pre-study, practice) 16 4 64
Mid-terms 1 13 13
Assignments 0
Final examination 1 35 35
Other 6 15 90
Total Work Load:
Total Work Load/25(h):
ECTS Credit of the Course: